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Abstract
In this paper I investigate the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma when individuals change
their strategies subject to performance evaluation of their neighbours over variable time horizons. In the
monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing
past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators. For co-evolutionary models,
in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally
associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time
horizons. Moreover, considering the continuous spectrum in between enhanced and discounted weights
of past performance, cooperation is optimally supported when cooperators neither give enhanced weight
to past nor more recent events, but simply average payoﬀs. Payoﬀ averaging is also found to emerge as
the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the
evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.
Introduction
Altruism is a widely observed phenomenon in the social sciences, biology and economics and one might
even argue that it is the fundamental characteristics that holds human society together. Its emergence
and sustainability in populations of self-interested agents is conveniently modelled in the framework of
evolutionary game theory [1]. Among with public goods games and the snowdrift game, the probably
most widely studied example in the ﬁeld is the prisoner’s dilemma game, describing the simultaneous
decision making of two individuals in a conﬂict situation, in which two options typically labelled “C”
(for cooperate) and (“D”) for defect are available. Depending on the mutual choices, agents receive a
payoﬀ of R for mutual cooperation, defect against cooperate receives T vs. S for the cooperator, and the
payoﬀ for mutual defection is P. In the prisoner’s dilemma these payoﬀs are ranked T > R > P > S and
2R > T, such that independent of the opponent’s strategy defection always yields a higher payoﬀ than
cooperation. In contrast, mutual cooperation yields the highest combined payoﬀ for the group. This
raises the question: How can maximum group outcomes be achieved even though it is beneﬁcial for the
individual to defect?
Many previous works have addressed this question in various contexts. Nowak [2] classiﬁes possibile
solutions into ﬁve categories, amongst which are mechanisms like kin selection, group selection, direct
and indirect reciprocity and network reciprocity. Starting with studies of spatial graphs [3] which have
later been extended to small world [4] and scale-free networks [6] particularly the latter has found much
interest in the literature in recent years, see [5,8,26] for reviews. Network reciprocity describes a “viscous”
population, i.e. a situation in which individuals can only interact with a ﬁxed set of partners and not
with the whole group. Cooperation can survive to some extent, because cooperators can positively assort,
thus shielding themselves from invasions of defectors. In spite of this, in the asynchronous model with
probabilistic updating on spatial lattices only very limited propertions of cooperators can survive.
Cooperation through network reciprocity can be further supported by opponent selection mechanisms
that enhance the shielding of clusters of cooperators [11,18] or by including various forms of heterogeneity
into the models. Some such examples of cooperation supporting heterogeneity are network heterogeneity2
[4,6,7] payoﬀ noise [19,20], quenched noise in payoﬀs [9], and various forms of unevenness in strategy
pass, like learning and teaching [13], aspirations [16,17] or others [12].
Over the last couple of years the focus in the ﬁeld has increasingly shifted to co-evolutionary models,
see [26] for a review. In these models an evolution of individual-speciﬁc traits at a timescale comparable
to the timescale of the spread of game strategies is considered. Examples are studies on co-evolving
networks [21–23], but more recently also investigations of co-evolving noise levels [14], aspirations [17],
learning and teaching [10,25] or co-evolving update rules [24], which have served as a major inspiration
for the present paper.
Recently, Chadefaux and Helbing [15] proposed a mechanism of wealth accumulation to support
cooperation. In their model wealth is created endogenously from game interactions. Agents accumulate
payoﬀs indeﬁnetely by playing games with stakes that are proportional to an agent’s accumulated wealth.
The authors report that cooperation is maximally supported when agents risk their entire wealth in every
encounter whereas support for cooperation is rather low when small proportions of wealth are at stake.
Risking a ﬁxed stake of payoﬀ in every encounter allows for an over-exponential growth of total wealth
between cooperators and the study thus links wealth accumulation to (extremely) uneven endogenously
created distributions of payoﬀ and wealth.
In many ways [15] is also the starting point of this paper. I propose a model in which agents consider
diﬀerently weighted accumulated (and suitably normalized) payoﬀs of their opponents as the basis of
decisions for strategy adoption. Suitable normalization of payoﬀs and constant payoﬀs in the game exclude
the mechanism of wealth heterogeneity described in [15] as the mechanism responsible for cooperation.
A weighting scheme of past and present payoﬀ can be regarded as an agent’s perspective on perfor-
mance evaluation. I then proceed by considering prespectives and game strategies as co-evolutionary:
agents can adopt their neighbours’ game strategies (cooperate or defect), but can also adapt their per-
spective, i.e. the rule through which they evaluate a neighbour’s success.
Speciﬁcally, I aim to answer two questions in this paper: (i) is the supporting eﬀect of accumulation
necessarily related to unevenness in wealth (or ﬁtness)? and (ii): what is the inﬂuence of diﬀerent ways
to weigh past and present payoﬀs on cooperation? Can agent’s perspectives and strategies co-evolve
in such a way that cooperation is supported? After explaining the details of the model, I proceed to
address the ﬁrst question in the next section. Following from this, the co-evolution of strategies and
perspectives is investigated and the results are summarized and discussed in the context of the literature
in the concluding section.
Results
Model
More speciﬁcally, I consider a set of N agents which are located on a spatial lattice with von Neumann
neighbourhoods. Agents are engaged in a prisoner’s dilemma game with their nearest spatial neighbours
and can play either one of two pure strategies: cooperate (s = 1) or defect (s = 0). I follow a large
portion of the literature and parameterize the game via
￿
R S
T P
￿
=
￿
1 −r
1 + r 0
￿
, (1)
thus leaving parameter r to control the dilemma strength. As usual, for r ≪ 1 the dilemma setting is
weak and for r cose to one the strongest conﬂict between individual and group interests is found.
In every round of the evolutionary game, a randomly picked focus agent, say i, and a randomly selected
neighbour, say j, of the focus agent play a one-oﬀ prisoner’s dilemma game against each of their respective
neighbours. This determines their instantaneous payoﬀs πi(t) and πj(t). In a next step, the focus agent3
can adapt its strategy. This is modelled in the typical way how imitation dynamics are represented in
evolutionary games, i.e. agent i will adopt the strategy of agent j according to a probabilistic rule [27]
P(sj → si) =
exp(κΠj)
exp(κΠi) + exp(κΠj)
, (2)
where the parameter κ gives the noise in the strategy updating process. Thus, agents will typically adopt
strategies of neighbours whose performance Π they value more highly than their own. Performance in
the game is evaluated over a time horizon of the last Tmem game interactions according to diﬀerently
weighted current and past payoﬀs via
Π(t) =
1 − δ
1 − δTmem
Tmem−1 X
t′=0
δt
′
π(t − t′). (3)
In equation (3) the parameter δ represents a discount/interest rate of past interactions. If δ < 1 a
player’s evaluation time horizon is eﬀectively shorter than Tmem and the eﬀect of past game outcomes
on the performance measure is low. Contrariwise, δ > 1 corresponds to a strongly weighted past such
that performance is mainly determined by the past and the inﬂuence of the latest game interactions of
a player is negligible. The limit of δ = 1 corresponds to a simple average that neither discounts nor
exaggerates past events. Also note the normalization factor in Eq. (3) which ensures −r < Π(t) < 1+r,
thus allowing the consistent treatment of noise in strategy propagation.
There are two straightforward interpretations of the parameter δ. First, one can assume that the value
of δ is determined externally and δ is more or less equal for all agents. In the limit of low noise values
κ this case corresponds to a biological scenario similar to the model of wealth accumulation described
in [15] (but notice the important diﬀerence that the agent’s stakes in the game are independent of payoﬀ
in the present model!). Agents accumulate payoﬀ over some time horizon given by the discount rate δ
after which they can replicate. The success of their game strategies is only evaluated at this point in
time. Importantly, the typical number of game interactions before payoﬀs are evaluated is given by the
discount factor. Realistic scenarios are such with δ < 1 describing growth subject to depreciation, but
also δ > 1 might be realistic for some organisms for which events in early life are very important to
determine later ﬁtness. The scenario of δ < 1 might also be interpreted as a growth process subject to
decay at rate 1 − δ, e.g.
Π(t + 1) = δΠ(t) + π(t), (4)
and strategy spread or replication which occurs at timescales much longer than those of the growth
process.
The second interpretation of δ is that it reﬂects an agents’ perspective. As such it would have to be
considered as agent-speciﬁc. Agents with low δ ≈ 0 are short-termers: they will adopt strategies from
others who did better than themselves in the last interaction. Agents with larger 0 < δ < 1 increasingly
base their evaluation on past as well as on present behaviour and agents with δ > 1 are agents that value
past interactions more highly than present ones. In this setting it is natural to consider a scenario in
which agents can change their perspectives as well as their game strategies. Realistically, perspective
changes will occur at a slower timescale than game strategy adaptations.
In the ﬁrst interpretation, to which I refer as monochrome models, the discount factor δ is externally
set to an equal value for all agents in the game. In this setting, with a probability given by equation (3)
the focus agent will only adopt the reference agent’s game strategy when updating. In the second setting,
that I refer to as co-evolutionary, agents will adapt their game strategies as well as their perspectives,
both occuring with the probability given by Eq. (3).
In more detail, simulation experiments are carried out on lattices of varying sizes according to the
following rules4
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Figure 1. Evolution of the concentration of cooperators over time. Parameter choices are
δ = 0.99, κ = 0.1, r = 0.8 and simulations were performed on a 100 × 100 lattice. Trajectories are
averaged over 50 runs, dashed lines indicate two times the standard deviation.
• Start with a random allocation of strategies to sites such that 50% of agents are cooperators and
50% are defectors. For every agent i the entire payoﬀ histories {πi(t)}
Tmem
t=0 are set to the payoﬀs
achieved in the initial population.
• In an asynchronous updating procedure, a focus agent i and a reference agent j are selected and
their respective current payoﬀs πi and πj are determined and stored in their payoﬀ histories. Only
payoﬀs over the last Tmem = 100 timesteps are stored and any information about past payoﬀ beyond
this is not taken into account.
• The performance measures Πi and Πj of i and j according to i’s perspective are determined. With
probability P(sj → si) agent i adopts the strategy (and possibly perspective) of j.
• Iterate steps (ii) and (iii) over T1 sweeps over the full lattice until a quasistationary state has been
reached and then average statistics over another T1 sweeps to determine the stationary number of
cooperators nc = 1/(NT1)
P2T1
t=T1
PN−1
i=0 si.
The case of monochrome discounting
In this section I will consider the case that all agents share the same interest/discount parameter δ. Figure
1 shows a typical trajectory for the evolution of cooperation in a tough dilemma situation (r = 0.8) when
strategy spread is inﬂuenced by memory of past payoﬀs (δ = 0.99). Illustrations of typical arrangements
of cooperators and defectors at the various stages of the evolution are given in Fig. 2. Starting with a
random allocation of cooperators and defectors, the evolution follows the known pattern: defectors can
earn the highest payoﬀs in random arrangements and consequently they spread over a large part of the
lattice, such that only little pockets of cooperators remain. Once an ordered arrangement of cooperators
and defectors has been reached, clusters of cooperators may start to expand again until an equilibrium
between cooperators and defectors is reached.
Crucially, however, when strategy spread is based on the immediately preceding payoﬀ earnings, coex-
istence equilibria between cooperators and defectors are only possible for very weak dilemma strengths.
This case corresponds to a discount rate of δ = 0 in my parameterization. For the noise level and5
Figure 2. Snapshots of agent conﬁgurations on a 100 × 100 lattice. The snapshots were taken
after 60, 300, 650, and 10000 full update sweeps. Parameters are δ = 0.99, r = 0.8 and κ = 0.1.
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Figure 3. Dependence of the frequency of cooperation on the dilemma strength. (left)
Dependence of nc on r for various values of δ (see legend) for κ = 0.1 on a 400 × 400 square lattice.
(right) Phase diagram depicting the extinction threshold of cooperation (r
(0)
c ) and the extinction
threshold of defection (r
(1)
c ) depending on the timescale of payoﬀ evaluation δ0 = δ1 = δ for a square
lattice with κ = 0.1. Error bars are smaller than the size of the symbols. Notice, that cooperation can
always dominate if δ is slightly larger than one.6
neighbourhood speciﬁcations used in the above simulations, a second order phase transition is found at
a critical value of r = rc. This transition belongs to the universality class of directed percolation [5,27].
In typical simulations based on updating of recent payoﬀs (i.e. δ = 0) this critical dilemma strength at
which cooperators go extinct is found at rc = 0.02112(2) [5]. In stark contrast, the simulations illustrated
in the panels of Fig’s 1 and 2 indicate that if updating takes account of past game outcomes, cooperation
can survive for much larger dilemma strengths than expected.
By presenting a more thorough investigation of phase boundaries, the panels of ﬁgure 3 reinforce this
point. The data illustrate that the support for cooperation grows systematically, when more and more
emphasis is placed on the evaluation of past payoﬀs. A more detailed analysis of the phase transitions
where cooperation or defection die out is given in the bottom panel of the ﬁgure. For r > r
(0)
c cooperation
dies out and defection dominates, for r < r
(1)
c cooperation dominates and in between for r
(0)
c < r < r
(1)
c
mixed equilibria of cooperators and defectors are possible (cf. the regions labelled “C”, “D”, and “C+D”
in Fig. 3). The detailed analysis of the phase transitions reveals that for choices of δ slightly greater
than one, cooperation can even dominate over the entire range of dilemma strength, thus resolving the
dilemma in any situation!
What is the reason for the strong support for cooperation from the evaluation of past payoﬀ? To
understand this, consider a defector at the boundary of a cluster of cooperators. In a typical conﬁguration,
such a defector exploits a number of cooperators at the cluster’s boundary and thus achieves a larger
payoﬀ than most cooperators in its neighbourhood. However, discounting payoﬀ essentially introduces
a delay between the start of the exploitation of the cooperators by the defector at the boundary and
the time when this exploitation becomes visible in the payoﬀ histories. Hence, there is a period of time
during which the eﬀective performances of the cooperators at the boundary appear superior due to good
past payoﬀ results (when they were still surrounded by cooperators) and thus, even though a boundary
defector may have obtained larger payoﬀs in the recent past, it cannot immediately invade surrounding
cooperators. Clearly, this delay slows down the spread of defectors and thus promotes the spread of
cooperators. The delay until most recent payoﬀs become eﬀective in agent’s performances is related to
the parameter δ. Larger δ implies a longer delay. Hence, following this argument one also expects that
the support for cooperation grows with δ which is corroborated by simulation results, cf. Fig. 3.
If one follows the interpretation of discounting as a rate of depreciation in a growth process, the above
result demonstrates a remarkably strong enhancement of network reciprocity if updating is based on a
measure that combines current and past payoﬀ. This support becomes the larger the more emphasis is
put on payoﬀ events farther in the past. However, already close to equally weighing past and current
payoﬀ can allow the dominance of cooperation over the entire range of dilemma strengths.
It is also worthwhile to emphasise that this support for cooperation is achieved without the extreme
wealth heterogeneity that is fundamental to cooperation in the model of [15]. In the present model the
stakes in the game are independent of past success and wealth distributions of cooperators and defectors
are the same as in the typical evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice.
If one follows the second interpretation of discounting as a subjective performance measure of indi-
viduals, the above results immediately raises the question if perspectives that support cooperation are
evolutionarily stable. In other words, can low discounting survive or even dominate in a population of
self interested agents? I address this question in the next section.
Co-evolution of cooperation and perspectives
Continuously varying perspectives
In this section I consider a model in which agents can inherit the perspective of the reference agent
when adopting its game strategy. As before, simulations are initialized with random allocations of 50%
cooperators and 50% defectors, but now agents are also assigned a perspective δ chosen from a uniform
distribution [0,δmax]. To account for mutations, in some cases perspectives are slightly modiﬁed when7
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Figure 4. Distribitions of evolved perspectives (δ) in the stationary state (top) and
dependence of the average frequency of cooperators on perspectives (bottom). The ﬁgures
show results from simulations on a 100 × 100 torus with r = 0.2, κ = 0.1. In the right hand panels a
small chance (pmut = 0.01) of misperception when adopting another agent’s strategies is included. In
case of a misperception, an agent adopts the opposite of the game strategy of the reference agent and
chooses a new perspective uniformly at random from the interval [0,δmax]. Without misperceptions
around 60% of agents are cooperators, with misperceptions only around 43% are cooperators.8
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Figure 5. Dependence of evolved memory lengths of cooperators, discount factors of
cooperators, and density of cooperators on costs per unit of memory. The setup is the same
as for the previous ﬁgure, but pmut = 0. Timescales are bounded by an upper limit of Tmax = 1000, and
simulations were performed on a 100 × 100 torus using κ = 0.1.
they are adopted. Technically, this is implemented as a 10% chance that a small random number from
the interval (−0.01,0.01) is added to the adopted perspective. Boundary conditions [0,δmax] are strictly
enforced in this process. Furthermore, I also consider the role of mutations when strategies are passed on
between agents. In such a case, with a small rate pmut, agents adopt a randomly selected game strategy
and a randomly selected new perspective.
By recording stationary distributions of perspectives (top) and giving statistics of the frequencies
with which agents with a certain perspective are cooperators (bottom), ﬁgure 4 summarizes typical
simulation outcomes on a 100 × 100 torus for situations with and without mutations. In both cases, a
clear separation of agents into two groups becomes apparent. One peak of the bimodal distribution of
perspectives corresponds to agents who almost always defect, the second to agents who almost always
cooperate (cf. bottom panels of Fig. 4).
If mutations are included, the distribution of δ-values for defectors becomes much broader and a
further distinction between two classes of defectors becomes apparent. Agents with δ < 1 are almost
always defectors, whereas agents with δ > 1 tend to be defectors, but have an around 15% chance of
being a cooperator.
Further experiments for changing levels of noise in strategy propagation demonstrate that the location
of the defector peak at around δ ≈ 0.35 is an artifact of the level of noise in strategy propagation. In
fact, for κ = 0 one ﬁnds a much sharper ﬁrst defector peak at δ = 0. Noise in strategy propagation
and neutral drift of perspectives in the large areas of the lattice occupied by defectors then allow for the
survival of δ  = 0 defectors.
It is instructive to investigate a further extension of the model and allow memory lengths to co-evolve
with strategies and perspectives. Since defectors make little use of past information, memory lengths
of defectors are subject to random drift while memory lengths of cooperators keep increasing until the
marginal beneﬁt of further increases is counteracted by the noise level in strategy propagation. In real-
world situations memory is often associated with a cost. Including such a cost per unit of time in memory,
memory lengths of defectors quickly converge to zero. In contrast, memory lengths of cooperators reach an
equilibrium at which the costs of memory balance the advantages for strategy spread. Figure 5 illustrates
data gleaned from simulation experiments with co-evolving memory lengths, perspectives, and game
strategies. The ﬁrst panel gives the dependence of stationary memory length of cooperators on costs, the
second the corresponding stationary perspectives and the third the stationary densities of cooperators.
In all shown cases a coexistence equilibrium of cooperators and defectors could be reached. This becomes
impossible above some cost threshold, at which memory becomes too costly for cooperators to allow for9
meaningful long-term evaluation.
The above experiments give a clear indication that a consensus of perspectives in the population is
not an evolutionarily stable outcome. Instead, defectors have a natural tendency to employ a short time
perspective, whereas cooperators are natural long-term evaluators. Interestingly, however, the evolution-
arily stable (and optimal as we will see in subsection ) outcome for cooperators is not an overly strong
emphasis on the past which was found to be a strong enhancer of cooperation in the monochrome case.
Instead, perspectives of cooperators are stabilized at around δ = 1 which corresponds to taking averages
of past payoﬀ.
This distinction of optimal perspectives for cooperators and defectors can be understood by a simple
argument. As argued in the previous subsection, defectors who evaluate past performances when updating
strategy are aﬀected by the delay between suboptimal immediate payoﬀs and when they become eﬀective
in payoﬀ histories. In their perspective, cooperators at the boundary of a cluster of cooperators appear to
have larger payoﬀs and hence they are likely to adopt the strategy of cooperators. In contrast, defectors
who only evaluate short term payoﬀs are unaﬀected. Short term defectors perceive their payoﬀs as larger
than those of boundary cooperators and cannot easily be invaded by them. However, in the view of long
term cooperators, the payoﬀs of short term defectors at ﬁrst also appear inferior and cooperators will not
immediately adopt the defect strategy. This mismatch in perspectives delays the spread of defectors and
gives support to cooperation, albeit not as much as for monochrome long term evaluation in a population.
Why is averaging (δ = 1) the stable strategy for cooperators? I have argued before that longer time
horizons are essential for cooperators to survive. What remains to be answered is why δ > 1 is not a
stable perspective for cooperators. To understand this, note that clusters of cooperators are constantly
in ﬂux: they expand in some directions and shrink in others due to the invasion of defectors. Hence,
cooperators are often surrounded by other cooperators, but might sometimes also be at the boundary
and hence prone to exploitation by defectors. In case of δ > 1, such exploitation events in the past life of
a cooperator can occasionally be exaggerated, thus making the cooperator prone to adopt the strategy
of a defector. In contrast, averaging (δ = 1) prevents the impact of chance highlights of speciﬁc events
in the payoﬀ history and only cooperators who consistently happened to be at a boundary are prone to
invasion of the defect strategy.
Averaging in the face of short term defection: When can cooperation survive?
In the previous subsection I have demonstrated that cooperators naturally align themselves with perfor-
mance measures that average over time, whereas defectors tend to evaluate payoﬀ at a very short term
basis. This underlines that (in the absence of substantial levels of noise) perspectives in co-evolutionary
models will ﬁxate at only two distinct values of δ. For a systematic exploration of the sustainability of
cooperation in the presence of two possible perspectives I consider a discrete model. Perspectives are
co-evolutionary with strategies as before, but only two perspectives, δ0 = 0 and δ1 > 0 can be assumed.
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate typical scenarios in the evolution of cooperation in the above case and
several stages in the evolution can be discerned. Initially, long term horizons grow to dominance in both
the cooperator and defector populations. In the ﬁrst case this is the scenario described in the previous
subsection. In the case of defectors, the initial long-term horizons are related to the initial payoﬀ bonanza
for defectors in random allocations of cooperators and defectors. Long time horizons dominate, because
they can lock in a memory of the initially high payoﬀs reminiscent of the initial conditions. However,
when simulation times approach the memory time horizon of Tmem = 100, this memory starts to fade
and cooperators can invade the large areas of long term time horizon defectors. Pockets of short term
defectors are the only defectors that eventually survive and a ﬂuctuating steady state pattern of long
term evaluating cooperators and short term evaluating defectors is approached.
Figure 8 gives data for the phase boundaries between cooperation and defection for the two per-
spective scenario. The ﬁrst panel gives the dependence of equilibrium concentrations of cooperators on
the dilemma strength for various choices of δ0. In no case can cooperators dominate the population (in10
Figure 6. Snapshots of lattices conﬁgurations after 3,20,40,70,100 and 1000 sweeps (left to
right) in the co-evolution of perspectives and cooperation for δ0 = 1 and δ1 = 0. Cooperators
are blue, defectors red, darkness of the colour indicates perspective, dark indicates long term (δ0) and
bright indicates short term (δ1). See ﬁg. 7 for averaged trajectories.
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Figure 7. Co-evolution of perspectives and cooperation for r = 0.2, κ = 0.1 on a 100 × 100
lattice. The lines give trajectories for the (i) average density of cooperators, (ii) average perspective of
cooperators, and (ii) average perspective of defectors. Trajectories have been averaged over 100
simulation runs and the dotted lines give two times the standard deviation.11
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Figure 8. Dependence of cooperation on the dilemma strength when strategies and
perspectives co-evolve. (left) Dependence of the fraction of cooperators on the dilemma strength r
for various values of δ0 (see legend) for κ = 0.1 and δ0 = 0 on a 400× 400 square lattice. Notice, that
the optimal perspective for cooperation is no longer the largest possible value of δ0 as in Fig. 3, but
cooperation is maximized near δ = 1. (right) Phase diagram depicting the extinction threshold of
cooperation depending on the largest timescale of payoﬀ evaluation δ0 (while δ1 = 0) for a square lattice
with κ = 0.1. Error bars are smaller than the size of the symbols.
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Figure 9. Dependence of cooperation on the choice of perspectives for r = 0.2 and κ = 0.1
on a 400 × 400 torus. Support for cooperation generally grows, the larger δ0 and δ1, but if one of the
perspectives is smaller than one, cooperation is optimally supported if the other perspective averages
payoﬀ histories (i.e. δ = 1).12
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Figure 10. Dependence of cooperation, average perspectives of cooperators and average
perspectives of defectors (left to right) on evolutionary timescales. Simulations are for
r = 0.6, κ = 0.1 (top) on 400 × 400 and for r = 0.33 (bottom). In the plots of average perspectives of
cooperators and defectors black regions indicate the absence of cooperation or defection.
contrast to the monochrome setting discussed previously), but coexistence equilibria of cooperators and
defectors are still possible even for rather tough dilemma situations. The data clearly demonstrate that
the support for cooperation is maximized very close to δ0 = 1, i.e. the perspective that averages payoﬀ.
This ﬁnding is reinforced by an analysis of the extinction threshold for the mixed phase given in the
bottom panel of Fig. 8. The extinction thresholds r
(0)
c have a sharp peak around δ0 = 1. Exaggerat-
ing recent or past events in payoﬀ histories strongly reduces support for cooperation and for δ  = 1 the
extinction thresholds quickly approach the known phase boundary r
(0)
c = 0.02112(2) for spatial lattices
with von Neumann neighbourhoods [5].
We thus see that cooperation not only naturally associates with an ‘averaging’ perspective, but av-
eraging is indeed also the perspective that maximizes support for cooperation. Strictly speaking, the
above experiments only demonstrate this for competition between a long term perspective and basing
performance on payoﬀs from the last game interaction (i.e. δ1 = 0). Some further experiments clarify
the situation for competition between arbitrary perspectives, cf. the map plot of Fig. 9. These results
clearly highlight that over a large range of (δ0,δ1) values cooperation is maximized when it can associate
with averaging. In fact, this is always the case, if δ0 < 1 or δ1 < 1. Only if δ0 > 1 and δ1 > 1 the scenario
described in the previous subsection applies. In this regime, cooperation grows the larger the value of
delta.
Coupling between strategy and perspective pass
In the previous subsection it has been assumed that game strategies and perspectives are passed on
simultaneously when an agent imitates another. How important is this tight coupling between the passing
on of strategy and perspective? To investigate this problem, a further modiﬁcation of the original models13
is introduced. Now, if a focus agent decides to imitate a reference agent, game strategy and perspective
are imitated probabilistically. Three situations need to be distinguished. In the ﬁrst, with probability
pstrat the focus agent will only copy the game strategy of its reference. In the second, with probability
ppersp it will only copy its reference’s perspective and in the remaining cases (i.e. with probability
pjoint = 1 − pstrat − ppersp) both, game strategy and perspective, are passed on. This description allows
an exploration of the inﬂuence of the timescales of strategy and perspective spread as well as of the role
of the coupling between strategy and perspective pass.
Simulations have been carried out for an exhaustive exploration of the parameter space spanned by
the probabilities pstrat, ppersp, and pjoint. By giving the average prevalence of cooperators and average
perspectives of cooperators and defectors, Figure 10 visualizes the results. Two dilemma strengths are
analysed in the ﬁgure, a very tough dilemma setting with r = 0.6 (top panels) and a lower setting with
r = 0.33 (bottom panels). Three observations stand out.
First, tight coupling between game strategy pass and perspective pass (bottom right corner) impede
the spread of cooperation. In this regime defectors can associate with short term evaluation and thus
– by a mismatch of perspectives as argued before – inhibit the spread of cooperators. In the case of
looser coupling in strategy and perspective pass, this association becomes less strict. Whereas surviving
cooperators are still always associated with long-term evaluation, increasingly more long-term evaluating
defectors exist. In a scenario of monochrome long-term perspectives, however, cooperation ﬁnds much
more support, see section .
Second, also very fast strategy pass does not beneﬁt cooperation, because it slows down the spread
of perspectives and thus allows the separation of typical perspectives of cooperators and defectors (see
top corner in Fig. 10).
The third observation from Fig. 10 is that when rates of strategy pass are much slower than rates of
perspective pass defection is favoured. To see this, recall that long-term evaluation beneﬁts cooperation,
because there is a delay between the start of the exploitation by defectors and the time when this
exploitation becomes apparent in eﬀective payoﬀs. During this time interval defectors are prone to
invasion by cooperators, but cooperators are ‘protected’ from invasion by defectors through their payoﬀ
histories. Very slow game strategy pass reduces this advantage, since for the spread of game strategies
payoﬀ histories have an eﬀective length of Tmem(pstrat+pjoint). Hence the respective delay times become
shorter. Incidentally, this also strongly increases the pressure towards an evolution of longer memory
lengths if memory lengths are allowed to co-evolve with strategies.
Discussion
In this paper I have investigated the impact of performance evaluation subject to variable time horizons
and diﬀerent discounting schemes on the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. I demonstrate
that accounting for past success when updating strategies can strongly inﬂuence network reciprocity.
Support for cooperation by network reciprocity is found to grow, the stronger past payoﬀs are weighted
when evaluating the performance of an agent in the game. The ﬁnding helps to disentangle the eﬀects
of wealth heterogeneity and payoﬀ accumulation described in [15]. The present model demonstrates
that cooperation can be supported by an accumulation scheme without the endogenous generation of
extremely uneven wealth distributions as in [15]. In some ways, one may see this as similar to the eﬀect
of a discrepancy between strategy adaptation speeds and game speeds described in [28] or the possibility
that an inferior strategy with long memory can sometimes beat a superior strategy with short memory
described in a somewhat diﬀerent context in [29].
More importantly, I have demonstrated that low discounting is not an evolutionarily stable strategy.
In co-evoluationary settings, one typically ﬁnds that defectors associate with very short term evaluation
rules whereas cooperators tend to be long term evaluators. The scenario is thus in some regards similar
to an essential innovation in the model of [23]: even though agents engage in the same game they have14
the ability to perceive this game diﬀerently.
The presence of short-term evaluating defectors destabilizes the arrangement of long-term evaluating
cooperators. Due to the ﬂuctuating nature of clusters of cooperators, very strong emphases on past
payoﬀs are no longer the best evaluation rule for cooperators. Instead cooperation typically associates
with averaging, i.e. equally weighing past and present game outcomes. Simulation experiments underline
that averaging is the evolutionarily stable strategy for cooperation in the face of short term evaluating
defection.
Interestingly, the averaging performance evaluation rule also maximizes the support for cooperation
in co-evolutionary settings. A careful investigation of phase boundaries shows that the co-evolution of
performance evaluation rules and game strategies strongly reduces the support that cooperation can gain
from long-term evaluation. Consequently, phases in which cooperation dominates the entire system are no
longer possible on square lattices. However, mixed equilibria between short term defectors and averaging
cooperators are still possible, extending the range of dilemma strengths in which cooperation can survive
well beyound the extinction thresholds of cooperation in the standard setting [5].
The described separation of performance evaluation rules for cooperators and defectors is aﬀected
by the details of strategy and performance evaluation rule updating. Tight coupling in the spread of
both traits as well as timescales for game strategy spread much faster than those of the spread of the
performance evaluation rule favour this separation. One might argue that the latter corresponds to
socially realistic situations when individuals change their behaviour at a timescale much faster than the
timescale at which they modify their underlying belief set. The separation of performance evaluation
rules between defectors and cooperators vanishes, if strategies and performance rules evolve at similar
timescales and are inherited independent of each other.
Even though the behavioural model investigated in this paper is extremely simple, it is tempting to
speculate about the wider societal implications of the presented results. The present paper suggests that
short term evaluation is a hallmark of defectors, i.e. behavioural strategies that beneﬁt the individual
at the cost of society. Inducements to base the evaluation of business leaders on long term performance
have long been discussed in the media. The presented results seem to suggest that this would not only
lead to a fairer society, but that it might also strengthen cooperative (i.e. group-beneﬁtting) behaviour
in society.
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